Review Article

AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY (A CASE STUDY OF OBASANJO’S PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA 1999-2007)

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ABSTRACT

Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence is that of commitment to peace, security, territorial integrity and economic prosperity. It is committed to economic integration and sub-regional peace through ECOWAS which forms a building block for the integration and unity of Africa in general. Analysis of Nigerian foreign policy shows that her leaders operate within four concentric cycle of national interest, the inner most circle represent Nigeria’s own security, independence, and prosperity, and centered on its immediate neighbors: Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The second circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with its West African neighbors. The third circle focus on continental African issues of peace development and democratization. The fourth circle involves Nigeria’s relation with organizations, institutions, and the states outside Africa. Therefore the main Objective of this research is to study the foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration and how his preventive diplomacy made an impact to Nigeria’s image abroad. Data was extracted from various literatures and reports from Nigerian Ministry of foreign Affairs and employed content/descriptive analysis’ Finally, the paper recommends that Nigerian government should address the thorny domestic issues with a view to create a friendly investment climate and boost public and international image.

INTRODUCTION

The history of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1960 has constantly being changed though the principles guiding her foreign relations remain the same (Gambari, 1989). Nigerian leaders are largely responsible for these instalble foreign relations, since Nigeria’s foreign policy is deeply rooted in Africa with strategic emphasis on political and economic cooperation, peaceful dispute resolutions and global non alignment (Ogumbanjo, 2002). Analysis of Nigerian foreign policy shows that her leaders operate within four concentric cycle of national interest, the inner most circle represent Nigeria’s own security, independence, and prosperity, and centered on its immediate neighbors: Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The second circle revolves around Nigeria’s relations with its West African neighbors. The third circle focus on continental African issues of peace development and democratization.

The fourth circle involves Nigeria’s relation with organizations, institutions, and the states outside Africa (Adebanjo, 2008 ). It is evident to posit that the last twenty years have witnessed major changes in the pattern of global conflicts and international community’s response to them. Today, more than 90% of armed conflicts take place within rather than between states, with relatively few inter-state wars, traditional ways for interventions have become decreasingly significant, which humanitarian and human right principles have increasingly been invoked to justify the use of force in internal wars not always with authorization of the United Nations security council. Security situation particularly in Africa continues to cause the gravisest concern in the West and Central Africa in particular the threat that the internal conflict could spread and lead to armed confrontation between and among sovereign African countries. Conflicts in Africa have not only caused the death of million innocent civilians, it has also displaced, maimed, distrust and traumatized many millions more, which in turn has contributed to further distrust, suspicion, hate and division in the process (Harbom and wallanesteen 2005;123). Reacting to conflicts in Africa has proven highly expensive for the international community and has strengthened the case for
greater focus on conflict prevention rather than intervention which is in line with the popular assumption that Prevention Is Better than Cure. The former Nigerian president chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration is considered as remarkable for its ability to enhance peace in areas where there is conflict, especially in Africa, and contributed immensely to the peace missions across the globe, thereby winning friends for Nigeria and earning Nigeria’s respect among the comity of nations. This study will examine the role, relevance and success of preventive diplomacy in responding and preventing violent and protracted conflicts in Africa, in particular Obasanjo’s preventive diplomacy to make comprehensive and all inclusive peace settlement for Africa, also its impact to Nigeria’s image and respect in the international community during the regime 1999-2007. The objective of this paper is to conduct a study on the Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo’s civilian administration and how his preventive diplomacy made a significant impact to Nigeria’s image abroad. The paper adopts the methodology of documentary analysis of current relevant literature.

Literature Review

Preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy as a term suggesting pro-active, rather than reactive, responses to international crises, preventive diplomacy seems to be firmly enshrined in the contemporary global collective security arrangement. The UN Charter states that the goal of the organization is to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace. The concept of “peace observation” is practiced by both the UN and its predecessor, the League of Nations; it was used as an international instrument to prevent or end hostilities, while its successor notion, “peacekeeping”, which is also defined by the International Peace Academy as the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states. (Rikkhe, 1984). In this broad sense, as Inis Claude notes that, the development of the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy* is one of the most original contributions of the UN system to the maintenance of international peace and security. (Claude, 1984). In reality, however, the usage of the term has been considerably imprecise and dependent on the prevailing international climate.

The first specific and consistent usage of the term misattributed to the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. For Hammarskjold, whose name is associated with preventive diplomacy much in the same way as Woodrow Wilson's is associated with collective security; the simple goal of preventive diplomacy was to keep local conflicts from being entangled in superpower rivalry (Larus, 1965) and (Knight, 1993). The twin objectives of preventive diplomacy were to keep newly arising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differences, and in the case of conflicts on the margin of, or inside, the sphere of bloc differences...to bring such conflicts out of this sphere through solutions aimed at their strict localization (Foote, 1975). Hammarskjöld’s concept envisaged a number of instruments, such as "hotlines", risk-reduction centers and transparency measures, that would help to recognize and fill any vacuum of power in conflict situation to avoid action by one or the other of the superpowers that might lead to escalation and nuclear confrontation (Boutros-Ghali, an agenda of peace, 1993a). As a third party contingency approach to conflict management, peacekeeping, is one of the novel techniques” of “Conflict Diplomacy” which has gained wide currency in the contemporary international arena. However, despite its extensive application, peace-keeping as a conflict control measure was not foreseen by the founders of the organization and therefore not reflected in the theoretical substructure of the U.N. Charter. Rather, it originated as an experimental compromise between collective security or permanent paralysis which confronted the organization as a result of the virulent ideological polarization of the international system. (Bassey, 1993). The concept of preventive diplomacy has proven to be controversial (Lund, 1996). However, there appears to be consensus that PD is preventive diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of the involved parties. It helps to prevent disputes and conflicts, which could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability, from arising between states. PD also helps prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and can therefore help to minimize their impact (Forum, 2000.). Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping peace lies the responsibility of bringing hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the UN Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for the resolution of conflict (Nations U. , The Charter of the United Nations, 1945.) The processes of peacemaking have also been the subject of various resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly, including resolution A/RES/47/120 on An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy and related matters (Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for peace , 1995a).

An overview of preventive diplomacy at the united nation

Various UN Secretary-Generals have had constructive and focused agendas for preventive diplomacy. The following are samples of the positions taken by UN Secretary-Generals Dag Hammarskjöld, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon on preventive diplomacy. During the leadership of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary-General, the United Nations (Whose name is associated with preventive diplomacy much in the same way as Woodrow Wilson is associated with collective security) was expected to be a dynamic instrument enabling member state governments to develop forms of anticipatory action before a crisis boiled over, that is, through ‘preventive diplomacy’. For Hammarskjöld, the purpose of the UN was to create conditions where each main military block could have adequate space to work with others. Hammarskjöld performed preventive diplomacy personally or through senior staff of specialized agencies and programmers, through the Security Council or the General Assembly, or through regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy was regarded as requiring specific measures to create confidence, early warnings based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; and, in some situations, also preventive deployment (Djibom, 2008.). Just like Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali positively considered PD. Boutros-Ghali regarded PD as ‘the most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy to ease tensions before they result in conflict or if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995a:). Boutros-Ghali also performed preventive diplomacy personally or through senior staff of...
specialized agencies and programmers, the Security Council or the General Assembly, or regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations (Boutros-Ghali 1995a). As UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan too had a special place for PD. In 2001, he proposed renaming ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘preventive action’. For him, preventive diplomacy was particularly favored by member states as a means of preventing human suffering and as an alternative to costly political-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have occurred. Although diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, the United Nations’ experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that could have useful preventive results. For instance, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament, preventive humanitarian action, and preventive peace building, which involve the consent of the government or governments concerned, as well as a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights, and economic and social development. For this reason, Annan decided to rename the activity ‘preventive diplomacy’ as ‘preventive action’. It is of interest to note that he emphasized that ‘preventive action’ should be limited mostly to measures stated under Chapter VI of the Charter, but also noted that enforcement action as provided under Chapter VII must remain a legitimate means of last resort in order to prevent massive violations of fundamental human rights or other serious threats to peace (Annan, 2000).

Ban Ki-moon as the eighth UN Secretary-General, has gone even further in presenting preventive diplomacy, specifically for Africa, in the form of a four-pronged approach. First, the strengthening of UN partnerships with all stakeholders should be continued. Successful peace processes require the contributions of a range of actors, at both the regional and international levels. The UN has, for example, a political office in Dakar, serving West Africa to forge innovative working relations with the African Union and ECOWAS – helping to address political crises throughout the sub-region with a model that could usefully be replicated elsewhere. Second, it should be ensured that developments include the increasing use of international contact groups and elders’ structures. Recent engagements in Guinea, Niger, the Comoros and Kenya have shown what the UN political affairs sector can do. Progress can only be achieved through partnerships that yield a combination of influence, impartiality, capacity and capability. Effective preventive action depends critically on the willingness of the parties in the conflict to engage. The UN understands motives, calculations and incentives used to prevent violence between parties in dispute, thus improving the targeting actors that it is in their own interest to accept diplomatic assistance to avert conflict. Neighboring countries and sub-regional organizations could exercise a unique influence, and perhaps serve as key allies. Third, the international community is to continue to invest in prevention. The global economic crisis put new pressures on resources, and there is an overall trend towards doing more with less. Diplomatic approaches and responses, when successful, are highly cost-effective. And fourth, the UN ought to support and encourage the role of women in preventive diplomacy. Repeatedly, women in Africa and elsewhere have demonstrated a strong commitment in working to achieve sustainable peace (Migiro, 2010).

The Security Council Resolution 1325 reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace building, yet women are still underrepresented in the formal stages of conflict prevention (Council, 2000.)

UN preventive diplomacy in Africa

In Africa, authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces and responsive governments. The form, scope, and intensity of these processes differ in Eastern Africa, West Africa and Southern Africa, but they are sufficiently similar to indicate a continental phenomenon. Parallel to these political changes, many states are seeking more open forms of economic policy, which may create a continent-wide sense of dynamism and movement towards less confrontational relationships. Regional and continental associations of states are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced types of communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of states to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations such as the AU and sub-regional organizations as IGAD. At the same time, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty are springing up, and the cohesion of states is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion, and on the other by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine democratic growth and change. This new dimension of insecurity obscures the continuing and devastating problems of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, availability of drugs, and the growing disparity between rich and poor. Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair abound, combining to produce globally a millions of refugees and displaced persons coupled with massive migrations of peoples within and beyond national borders. These are both sources and consequences of conflict that require the continuous attention of the United Nations and international community in general.

Security developments in Africa continue to cause concern not only to African states but also the United Nations. In West and Central Africa in particular, the threat that internal conflicts will spread and lead to armed confrontations between sovereign African states is a worrying development. For instance, several African countries are involved in the ongoing hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the same sub-region, the UN successfully participated in the ONUB mission in Burundi, which culminated in elections. In Sierra Leone, whose people were victims of one of the most brutal conflicts in recent times, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) worked assiduously to help facilitate a negotiated solution. In close cooperation with ECOWAS, its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and other interested member states, UNOMSIL actively supported the process of negotiations between the Government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which led to the signing on 7 July 1999 of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Following the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Security Council authorized an expansion of UNOMSIL. Recognizing the close relationship between the promotion of human rights and sustainable peace, UNOMSIL, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCR), continues to monitor and report on human rights abuses in Sierra Leone with a view to ending further violations Kabia, 2009. The outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 was a cause of profound disquiet. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia also had a tragic regional impact, particularly with regard to the conflict in Somalia. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) continues to assist regional efforts at peacemaking led by AMISOM. However, a lack of consensus on the mode of power-sharing among the various factions in Somalia has precluded settlement of the conflict. The main challenge is to strengthen international peacemaking efforts and identify initiatives that can be supported by all the relevant actors (Tegge, Melakou and Abebe Zegeye, 2007).

Following several internal and external consultations, the UN supported a successful referendum in South Sudan. The South Sudan situation that culminated in the referendum is a classic case where the UN, in collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations, worked to prevent the possibility of sliding back into conflict. The common effort was evident as on 9 July 2011 the Republic of South Sudan became the newest country in the world. In order to prevent the possibility of conflict in Southern Sudan, the UN adopted resolution 1996 (2011). However, the Security Council considered the situation in South Sudan might continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. As such The SC established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) starting from 9 July 2011. UNMISS has an elaborate three-pronged mandate. Firstly, to support peace consolidation and thereby foster longer-term state building and economic development. Secondly, to support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and for the protection of civilians. And thirdly, to support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors (S/RES/1996 (2011)). Besides the above cases, the United Nations has been involved for many years in Western Sahara, where recent consultations with the Government of Morocco and the French POLISARIO have finally resolved a longstanding impasse over a referendum for self-determination (Thompson and Adloff 1980). While these efforts stand out, Africa is not, of course, the only area of security concern for the United Nation.

Nigeria and preventive diplomacy in Africa (1999-2008)

The President Obasanjo’s administration was remarkable for its ability to enthrence peace where there is conflict, especially in Africa; and contributed to peace mission across the globe, winning friends for Nigeria and earning Nigeria respect among the comity of nations. (Ojewale, Making Peace Count”, 2007) (Ogunlowo, 2007) And (Oba, 2007) have articulated these efforts in the following ways: The eight years of the President Olusegun Obasanjo administration is likely to go down in history as perhaps one of the most effective regimes to promote peace in different parts of the world and restore confidence and credibility to Nigeria. Right from the time Obasanjo took over the reins of government, his message was clear: that peace and reconciliation would feature prominently in his agenda. Little wonder that at the summit of the defunct Organization of African Unity, OAU, in 1999, the President’s proposal that 2000 be made the year of Peace, Security and Solidarity unanimously was adopted by the summit. In September 1999, during the fourth extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, Obasanjo’s proposal for the convening of a Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, CSSDCA, was similarly adopted. The conference eventually held in Abuja in May 2000. Obasanjo’s administration successfully led sub-regional cooperation of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, GGC, in Libreville, Gabon in 1999. The GGC has as its objective the strengthening of economic and political cooperation among member states. The country has successfully held many international conferences to demonstrate its full reintegration in the comity of nations. In the same manner, Nigeria was largely responsible for dousing the ire created by the potentially dangerous land crisis in Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe had ceded land to veterans of the state’s struggle for independence. Obasanjo was able to achieve that using the instrumentality of the Commonwealth, which formally signed the Abuja Agreement which has remained the most credible mechanism for resolving the Zimbabwean crisis.

In Sao Tome and Principe, Obasanjo helped to uphold the sanctity of democracy when the military tried to torpedo its democracy in 2003. President Fradique de Menezes was on a state visit to Nigeria, July 16, 2003, when his government was toppled in a military coup d’état. Using his diplomatic connection and statesmanship, Obasanjo restored De Menezes to power seven days later. The feat was hailed as the first of its kind in Africa. The regime equally contributed to restoring peace in Guinea Bissau in September 2003. Similarly, the President played a prominent role in returning Togo to constitutionality in 2005. Following the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, February 5, the leaders of the nation’s military quickly swore in Faure Gnassingbe, his son, as President, to serve the rest of his father’s tenure. Leading other African heads of state, Obasanjo rejected the action and insisted that the country’s Constitution must be upheld and preserved. The young Gnassingbe eventually stepped down and later won the presidential election held in April 24. He was sworn in, May 4, 2005. And in Ivory Coast, Obasanjo has worked tirelessly to ensure that the crisis in the country does not escalate to a full-scale civil war. The progress recorded in the country so far is attributed to efforts of the President in collaboration with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. In the Mano River area, Nigeria under the leadership of President Obasanjo, helped to broker peace between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, Nigeria is playing a leading role in the task of reconciliation after years of devastating civil war. Nigeria has also contributed the sum of $100, 000 for the take-off of the Special War Crime Tribunal to try war criminals. The 15-year-old crisis in Liberia was effectively brought to an end through Nigeria’s ingenious diplomacy. It negotiated the exit of the then President Charles Taylor and enthroned an interim administration led by Gyude Brand. For permanent resolution of the crisis, the Obasanjo regime gave asylum to Taylor in Nigeria. The former president’s departure from Liberia facilitated implementation of the Accra Accord leading to successful conduct of presidential election in 2005 in which Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf emerged as the first woman president in Africa.
To drive home the point that Nigeria will promote peace at all cost, the country under the Obasanjo administration showed its respect for the rule of law by ensuring the peaceful implementation of the International Court of Justice ruling on the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. The country successfully handed over the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon in 2006. The management of the exercise was hailed in the international community as a model resolution for boundary disputes in the world. According to the foreign affairs ministry, “The policy of conflict prevention, resolution and management is borne out of the realization of the imperative of peace and security for sustainable democracy and economic development in Nigeria and the West African sub-region” (Ojewale, Gains of Diplomatic Shuttles, 2007).

But it seems to be more than that. Nigeria’s peace mission also covers every flashpoint across the globe. For instance, Nigeria is involved in peace mission in the war-torn Darfur in the Sudan, where more than 200,000 people have been killed and no fewer than one million people made homeless. Even the President himself admitted the number when addressing the Third Beinnial Leon H. Sullivan summit Dinner, June 20, 2002, about partnering with the United States on peace mission. “We have partnered with you in the peaceful and democratic transformation in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. We played our part in moving Sierra Leone from war to elections. We have worked diligently towards bringing peace in the Congo and in Angola. And thanks to the perseverance of President (Jose Eduardo) dos Santos and the people of Angola, we have finally claimed a victory after over 30 years of struggle in pursuit of freedom,” Obasanjo said. (Ojewale, 2007) The regime also held a political dialogue between Nigeria and the European Union, EU Presidency in May 2004. Substantive agreements were eventually reached on peace and security, governance and development, as well as the restatement of the imperative for cooperation and commitment.

Challenges of preventive diplomacy

This section presents general challenges and specifically those related to UN intervention in disputes and conflicts. There is a chasm between the tasks entrusted to the UN and the financial means provided. The truth of the matter is that the UN vision cannot really extend to prospective opportunities as long as financing remains myopic. There are two main areas of concern: the ability to function over the longer term and the immediate requirements to respond to a crisis. The United Nations is currently facing chronic underfunding and understaffing, especially in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which manages UN peacemaking activities globally. Closely related to this is the issue of logistics. In the case of peacekeeping, for example, not all governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service in conflict environments. While some equipment is provided by troop-contributing countries during peacekeeping, a great deal has to come from the United Nations, including kits to fill gaps in under-equipped national battalions. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. They must be procured from manufacturers, which create several difficulties. This is a major challenge. It is essential, therefore, for the UN to consider a pre-positioned stock of basic peacekeeping equipment so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, and generators, would be immediately available at the start of an operation (Cuny, 1991). The UN also faces other obstacles in the way of increasing the scope and effectiveness of its action in preventive diplomacy. First, governments and leaders engaged in conflict sometimes do not want UN help. Early involvement is often essential to the success of PD, but parties to conflicts often are not willing to admit they have a problem until the conflict has escalated beyond their control. They may contemplate avoiding legitimizing an adversary or ‘internationalizing’ their problem by keeping the UN away or wrongly believing that UN involvement will quickly lead to the unwelcome presence of a large peacekeeping force or to Security Council sanctions. Second, there is the challenge relating to UN personnel professionalism, for effective preventive diplomacy and mediation is not only about being there and being fast, it is also about being good at what the UN does. Success requires more than simply naming a top envoy and starting up the process. On the contrary, mediation is a complex and increasingly professionalized field. Envoyos need more than their own wisdom to guide them. What is lacking in the UN system is a means of developing standard guidance training for mediators and their staff, distilling the best lessons from others’ experience and debriefing UN envoyos at the completion of their assignments to find out more about what works and what does not (Bercovitch, Jacob and Allison Houston, 1996).

Modesty and patience are paramount in any discussion of the success of preventive diplomacy. Progress aside, the United Nations and the international community as a whole have a long way to go before they can reliably predict conflict, prevent it, and respond effectively. Some drivers of conflict, including the existence of economic and social disparities, and unpredictable whims of ineffective leaders, are beyond the immediate reach of preventive diplomacy. In particular, there are certain challenges associated with the pre-conflict situation that are worth discussing. The key challenges to the United Nations, more so in the initial stages of conflict, include the fact that attention to pending or emerging problems is usually side-tracked by highly visible emergencies, actual war and violence. It always attracts much greater attention and a bigger share of the available resources. Normally, domestic support for measures addressing pending or emerging problems at home or abroad take a back seat to those that address highly visible emergencies (Adams, 1994). The principle of state sovereignty limits external involvement in the prevention or resolution of internal problems, especially at the pre-conflict stages. Although it might already be known that the impending outbreak of war in a state is imminent and that certain things can be done to reverse the situation and correct the problems that may eventually lead to violence, states are protected from external interventions by the principle of sovereignty. The relatively limited access to intelligence and fact-finding missions impedes early warning and analysis of risk assessment, hence the delay in timely intervention. There may be lots of early warning, but such warnings are often not matched with proposals for feasible and promising preventive measures. Another challenge is the definite lack of coherence and coordination between and within relevant non-state, state, and interstate actors who could implement preventive measures. Even if limited cooperation takes place, it does so in the context of a poor
understanding of the situation, and poor coordination based on the comparative advantage of cooperating actors. Nevertheless, there is also the difficulty in cooperating with and assisting local communities (Kennan, 1996). Similarly, there is no commonly accepted legal definition of intervention in a pre-conflict situation. There is simply no agreement on when, how, why and by whom intervention should be undertaken. (Sovereignty, 2001) Has a comprehensive and impressive study on ‘the responsibility to protect’. The problem with intervention is its acceptance. Most states believe that intervention must be the exception to the rule of non-interference, and can only to be applied if there is a clear international consensus on the necessity for external involvement in the solution of domestic crises.

**Major findings**

From the findings of the study the following can be inferred:

- Negative image has cost Nigeria great ordeals (sanctions, capital flight/divestment, and international isolation, etc) in the 90s which called for the reshaping of its foreign policy from 1999 to pursue her image and economic goals abroad.
- Preventive diplomacy has helped in establishing and resuscitating the bilateral/multilateral relation Nigeria has with other countries across the globe which created avenue for integration to nation’ comity relations as well as investment flow to Nigeria.
- The era of Obasanjo’s preventive diplomacy gave more emphasis on foreign issue compared to how it handled domestic/ internal political crisis.
- Apart from image and confidence building abroad Nigeria also gained more foreign investors through foreign direct investment (FDI), which is as a result of the confidence it gained which contributes positively to Nigeria’s economic growth.
- Political risk or instability in the country did not restrain overall investment flow into the economy, particularly in the oil sector, but in 2007 (due to political uncertainty created as result of third term bid of Obasanjo’s administration), the image of the administration starts dwindling and got vehement rejection from both national and international community because the constitution provides only two terms
- Finally, while image laundry and investment agreements did not bear a robust relationship to the immediate FDI inflow, it has a positive and significant relationship with the growth of investment relations and long run huge capital inflow into the economy, as indicated from 2002. In other words, an investment relation through professional shuttle diplomacy has the potential to generate more FDI into the Nigerian economy.

**Conclusions**

Nigeria has since independence been actively involved in the management of international peace, either under the sponsorship of the UNO, OAU, and AU or under the bold assumption of roles and certain specific responsibilities for the management of sub regional concerns. In its 51 years of flag independence, Nigeria’s decision makers have continuously designed, shaped and maintained a foreign policy which have continued to impact on the international system, especially in the area of facilitating peace-making at the international scene. Before the end of Obasanjo regime in 2007, official records of the countries he visited during his diplomatic shuttles as the country’s chief diplomat are still being kept under wraps. Aso Rock sources maintained that it is being treated as a Security document. But unofficial sources put the number of countries as more than 100. Without caring about the dictum that foreign policy derives support from the aggregation of a nation’s domestic politics, the Obasanjo’s regime pushed Nigeria at the fore front of peace making in Africa. Preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, especially in Africa where the economic, politico-social and geographical complexities make peace keeping unattractive. At the same time, preventive diplomacy requires early warning system and the speedy response to a crisis. Early warning should be provided by national government, and international information networks should support the international, regional and sub-regional organizations and advanced societies are further developed. Moreover, individual states should be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional and sub-regional bodies and comity of nations as well as the international agencies in order to begin peace negotiation before conflicts escalate. When this effort fails, peace keeping may be the next best option. Adequate funding should be made available for decision-makers for successful preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations.

**Recommendations**

This study has established that excellent foreign relations are useful in our interdependent world, as it yielded a positive result for Nigeria’s image abroad. But for more confidence and image building abroad Nigeria is still in need of addressing some vital domestic issues which invariably have umbilical relations with its foreign relevance, as such the following will serve as recommendations for further research:

- Nigerian government should address the thorny domestic issues with a view to create a friendly investment climate and boost public and international image. The federal and state governments must make a serious attempt to provide security and basic infrastructures for Nigerians as well as the sought after foreign investors. People cannot be expected to invest in an environment in which they do not feel secured and no adequate infrastructure. This if achieved, will enable the country play a key role in regional, continental and global affairs.
- Corruption and favoritism in the selection of diplomatic envoys must be avoided to create room for credible team of professionals. Careful selection of presidential entourage in foreign investment trips should be put in place.
- Strengthening bilateral and multilateral investment relations is crucial for Nigeria to attract more FDI in its new refocused shuttle diplomacy that should be handled by a team of refutable diplomats via foreign missions.
- Nigerian government should initiate a well-orchestrated policy measure to strengthen its economy and save its currency from unnecessary devaluation as it affected its image and that of Nigerians living abroad. And Nigeria’s image building should be a responsibility of every Nigerian, particular those in diaspora.
• A re-definition of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives has, therefore, become

• Imperative in the contemporary global politics in order to bridge dissonance between foreign polices and expectations. The goal-values of her foreign policy should be re-constructed to include what Nigerians as individuals intend to gain specifically from the nation’s enduring strategic, economic and political diplomacy. In other words, Nigerians’ welfare and alleviation of mass poverty should be made the nation’s foreign policy priority, and by implication, Nigerians should be taken as the centre-piece of the nation’s foreign policy.

• A major substance of the re-definition agenda should be creating a new identity and image for Nigerians. The nation’s foreign policy planners and diplomatic missions abroad have a lot to do in forging a new image for Nigerians abroad. Nigerians lack a positive international identity, designing one for them becomes an urgent task for the nation’s diplomats. The diplomatic missions should engage in some aggressive image laundry for the nation and its citizens being exposed to ridicule and embarrassment across the globe. The president, as the nation’s chief diplomat, needs to go beyond diplomatic appeals for international recognition, foreign investments and debt relief.

• Finally the recent ongoing insurgencies of Boko Haram in the country which claimed thousands of innocent lives should handle effectively with more government commitment to end the menace else it will tantamount into diminishing of its image abroad.

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